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Abstract
There are few elements of public policy as important, or as deeply personal, as food 
policy. Government intervention in agriculture has been an expected norm in the 
United States since the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, but how has their 
action affected the individual rights of the consumer? This thesis aims to address the 
effects of eighty years of policy through direct impacts of legislation in the areas of 
biofuels, genetically modified foods, and corporate welfare.
The agricultural industrial machine has made the United States one of the world's 
top exporters for food, but at the cost of competition in the marketplace and 
personal freedom. Implications of US policy are both domestic and global, in today's 
world and pending in the future.
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I. I n t r o d u c t i o n : A g r i c u l t u r e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
The two things all Americans, and really any citizen of humanity, have facing 
them as a constant need, regardless of socioeconomic, cultural, or governmental 
influence is the need for food and water. Living in the United States comes with a 
litany of benefits, from a long line of independent-minded rebels not willing to settle 
for the standard, but always striving for a little more. These benefits include access 
to food. For m ost people in the country, save the very bottom percentages on the 
wealth scale, basic caloric intake isn't really ever out of reach. We are fortunate to 
have historically very low percentages of total income spent on food, especially 
when compared to the staggering amounts the world's poor spend on food out of 
their entire household income; access is further bolstered by federal, state, and 
private programs to aid those people that need the m ost in our society.
Food is cheap, tastes good, and comes in such large quantities it can actually 
be a little frightening to visitors. This is where the first question comes into play: can 
a system that provides so much, for such relatively little cost, have negative 
consequences? The obesity epidemic is a potential indicator of a problem. I've 
always been the first person to say that personal choice, not government decision
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making, should dictate the way people live their lives. Obesity can be a great chunk 
attributed to the personal choices of people.
However, the government has dictated major agricultural policy and directed 
the way the food industry is to grow, w hat they can grow, how they can grow it, and 
who can grow it, and how much it will cost. What started out as emergency policy 
during the Great Depression has evolved into an essentially government-controlled 
food market, with many players, motives, and outcomes- all seeming to focus solely 
on the short-term  benefits. The greatest irony of the potential for problems in the 
food industry is that no one can truly escape the effects, especially future 
generations.
Corn is the prim ary crop driving the US economy, the natural landscape of 
the Midwest and part of the heart of this nation in image and lifestyle. Through corn 
derived additives, feed-grain, and fuel, there is little in the food industry that corn 
doesn't impact. Given that only a small percentage of corn in the US is non- 
genetically modified/engineered, there is also a potential major problem of 
biodiversity and the potential for unknown long-term effects of modified food 
products that could invite of host of problems to the economy and health of the 
country.
It's clear the government presently has far reaching effects on food policy,
raising an im portant question-- In a heavily subsidized and regulated food industry;
does this role of government improve the product on the shelf and on the table of
5
Americans and as well as those abroad? Or has the food industry turned into 
pleasing political donors that reinforce with the status-quo instead of reflecting 
market-based, consumer-oriented solutions?
This thesis aims to uncover the government's direct role, historically and 
currently, in the food industry. Instead of a government that is supposed to be by 
the people and for the people, has a series of special interests turned w hat should be 
the m ost basic and fundamental choice of every person into decisions by an elite, 
above the people, for the highest bidder?
While I won't advocate throwing away a safety-net for the agricultural 
industry, for food is a major player in the web of security issues, I believe the 
current system of US policy is and has been failing the US consumer, free enterprise, 
and global ecology. The evolution of US policy, especially the farm bill, has been one 
from emergency, to welfare, to pork-barreling, to political suicide for those who 
speak against the allegedly “natural” m arket evolution. In this new state of 
emergency, our ever-present debt crisis and fallacies of solutions produced by 
lawmakers, it's time to take a step back and evaluate the causes, conditions, and 
effects of these questions, and assess the puzzle of the current food industry.
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II. G o v e r n m e n t  I n t e r v e n t i o n : L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s t o r y
Government Influence: 1789-19161
The U.S. Constitution became the supreme law of the land in 1789, without 
enum erated powers involving the agricultural sector2. The US government's 
involvement in farming began with the creation of an agricultural committee in the 
House of Representatives and Senate, in 1820 and 1825, respectively. Abraham 
Lincoln established the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1862, referring to it 
as the “people's departm ent”. From 1862-1914, various other bolstering of the 
Federal government's role in agriculture, especially research expanded the breadth 
of the USDA's capabilities.
From 1916  to 1930, there was a fairly substantial growth of intervention in 
the agricultural sector. These were the first attem pts to directly regulate the 
functioning of the network of farmers. 1916  presented the creation of the Federal 
Farm Loan Act, which created “cooperative ‘land banks'”3, the precursor to the Farm 
Credit System. It was a way to provide loans and assistance to farmers.
1 Edwards, Chris. "Department o f Agriculture." Downsizing the Federal Government. Cato
Institute. < http: //www .downsizinggovernment.org/agriculture> .
2 Edwards
3 Edwards
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The 1929  Federal Reserve System decision to decrease the U.S. money supply 
by one-third over the following four years deeply affected prices of commodity 
crops. The prices for staple crops dropped significantly, causing many farmers to be 
in extremely perilous situations. While sales plummeted, interests on mortgages and 
property taxes remained high, causing many to be on the verge of losing their land.
With the economy in depression, and calls for protection of US markets 
including farming, growing, President Hoover agreed to the Smoot-Hawley Act in 
1 9 3 0 4. This act increased tariffs for farm and industrial goods. Much of the 
international community responded with similar tariffs, causing exports to fall 60%  
by 1 9 3 3 5.
Great Depression and the AAA
The Great Depression wrought the first true test run of Keynesian economics 
in the United States. The clamoring for something, anything be done was heard loud 
and clear by Roosevelt. True to its theory of deficit spending, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt put forth a slew of government-induced demand. One of the largest 
monetarily, and in-purpose programs, was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
4 Edwards
5 Edwards
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(AAA). Considered to be a “cornerstone”6 in the New Deal, the primary goal was to 
enact a “centralized food policy”7.
At the time, twenty-five percent of Americans were living on farms8. External 
factors, i.e. extensive droughts and the global depression of food prices, created a 
situation where one quarter of the U.S. population was in one of the m ost volatile 
areas of the market, a staggering realization that led to staggering demand for 
action. The 1933 Act declared a national state of emergency in the farming industry, 
which was also crippling the ability to garner typical capital necessary for farm 
management throughout the system. Commodity crops were especially hard hit. A 
commodity crop in its m ost basic definition is a crop that is traded9. Generally, these 
crops are nonperishable and able to be stored and/or transported. Commodity 
crops in the context of US food policy are the ones directly regulated by the federal 
government10
The difference between the farm industry and any other industry being 
exposed to the business cycle is the basic human need, regardless of preference or 
socioeconomic class, to have sustenance. The AAA attem pted to “stabilize the
6 Kwan, Charlene C. "Fixing the Farm Bill: Using the "Permanent Provisions" In
Agricultural Law to Achieve WTO Compliance." Environmental Affairs 36
(2009): 571-606. Print.
7 Kwan 575
8 Kwan 575
9 Braun, Lois. "What Are Commodity Crops and Why Do They Matter?" Hampden Park Co-op.
03 Apr. 2012. Web.
10 Braun
9
agricultural sector”11 in two facets: price and production. The 73rd  Congress wanted 
to make up for the inability of farmers to purchase/pay for their “extraordinary 
expenses,”12 like machinery and labor costs.
The 1933 Act was explicitly built with language that ensured no measure in 
the act could be carried forth if it violated current Anti-Trust Laws13. This measure 
was in place to ensure that the small farms this act intended to protect weren't 
wiped out by the subsidy structure or potential conglomerates eager to buy up 
defaulted land.
Outlined in part two of the Act, under General Powers, the appointed 
Secretary of Agriculture quickly became one of the most powerful leaders in the 
United States. The general overtures of the Secretary's powers were outlined in 
three main points. First, reduction of current commodity production, through 
“rental benefit payments”14, essentially the government renting out the land to 
ensure crops are not grown and the physical storing of those crops that were 
deemed non-perishable15. It boils down to paying farmers not to farm their land to 
control production levels. Secondly, the Secretary was to manage the agreements 
with individual farmers, again reiterating that antitrust laws could not be broken
11 Kwan 575
12 United States. Cong. House o f Represenatives. 73rd Congress, 1st Session. H.R. 3835
Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31. The National 
Agricultural Law Center: United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012. 
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
13 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
14 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
15 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
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and that these agreements would be nullified once the act had passed its time limit. 
Lastly, the Secretary was also responsible for issuing and revoking licenses when 
appropriate16.
Loan rates were determined by the Secretary of Agriculture, “in light of 
current supplies and anticipated demand”17. Crops such as corn, wheat, and cotton 
were under m andatory loans, in the believing that the only way to stabilize across 
the system in this emergency state was to ensure everyone was under the same 
price structure for the most im portant crops, but provisions allowed for other crops 
to be included as seen fit18.
A 1933 executive order established the Commodity Credit Corporation 
(CCC)19. The Delaware based corporation's purpose was to provide emergency loans 
in cases where there was a substantial chance the farmer might put their crops on 
“already flooded m arkets”20. This allowed the government to control m arket supply 
directly. Virgil W. Dean of the CCC argued that the nonrecourse loans the CCC 
provided allowed for the m arket to still have stable prices when they began to fall to 
low levels21.
The CCC originally was conceived to be a tem porary government entity, to 
dissolve when the aggregate domestic economy was in a more stable position. Not
16 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
17 Kwan 577
18 Kwan 577
19 Kwan 577
20 Kwan 576
21 Kwan 577
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surprisingly, as with m ost government programs, the CCC quickly became a 
perm anent bureaucratic entity, far surpassing its initial sixteen month charter22.
Nonrecourse loans allowed the farmers to use their commodities as 
collateral, wherein the farmer could chose to reclaim the crop if the price increased 
to profitable levels, or to not reclaim. Not reclaiming the crop allowed the 
government to keep the commodity crop and be considered in full paym ent of the 
loan23. Between 1935  and 1936, farm income had risen dramatically, approximately 
fifty percent24, seen as a direct accomplishment of the Roosevelt Administration.
As with all government programs, there needed to be a provision on how 
this would be paid for. The result was a “processing tax”25 on those commodities 
outlined as ones that would be a part of this subsidy structure. The tax would be 
collected during the “first domestic processing and paid by the processor”26, at a 
rate determined by the difference between the m arket value farm price and the “fair 
exchange value”. The “Fair exchange value” gave the commodity in question the 
same value as it would have been on the m arket between 1909 and 1914, the 
“prew ar” period, excluding tobacco, which would be valued in the post-World War I 
period27.
22 Kwan 577
23 Kwan 577
24 Kwan 577
25 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
26 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
27 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
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“Processing” for wheat, rice, and corn entailed milling or any other post­
harvesting measures to get the product ready for the m arket28. However, processing 
tax excluded cleaning and drying, along with any commodity that was to be changed 
into a product for feeding livestock. The processing tax figures were to be made 
public by the Secretary of Agriculture. There would be no tax on the processing of 
crops deemed for export.
Section 11 of the Act defines w hat crops will be counted as “commodities”. 
These prim ary staple crops included: wheat, cotton, field corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, 
and milk (including by-products like milk and cheese29). Section 12 was where the 
money numbers started to pour out. The Secretary of Agriculture was to have 
$ 100 ,000 ,00030 that he would be able to use “until spent”31. This section also left 
open for possibility more money if it was used for the “expansion of markets and 
removal of surplus agricultural products and various administrative costs”. Adjusted 
for inflation, the base rate available to be spent today, at the discretion of the 
Secretary, would equal U S$175,000,390,667 (2 0 1 2  dollar value)32. The money made 
available was significant because this was considered and treated as a national 
emergency.
28 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
29 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
30 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
31 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
32 "The Inflation Calculator." The Inflation Calculator. Web.
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The Act had w ritten in that it was to be term inated when the crisis was 
considered to be over. Roosevelt in his executive, power-wielding wisdom said that 
it was up to him, as the head of state, to determine when the crisis was considered 
“over”. One of the last pieces of the AAA, under “Miscellaneous” states that the 
“Authority of the president is unrestricted as long as salaries of personnel stay 
under $10,000 per year”33.
$200 ,000 ,00034 additional US dollars would be made available to the Farm Loan 
Commissioner. These loans were to be used for the “reduction of debts and 
redemption of foreclosed farms”35. In today's dollar figures, this would be a fund 
w orth U S$3,508,771,929.82.
1936  Supreme Court of the United States: United States v Butler36
The ability of the Secretary of Agriculture to determine contracts, the 
nonrecourse loans, giving farmers direct payment for not producing and not placing 
crops on the m arket had to be paid for in some form. The money came from a 
congressional act that imposed a tax on domestic processing of certain commodities. 
The first person to process the product would be responsible for paying the tax, 
with exemptions for crops to be exported- another step to try and bolster the 
economy. The tax was deemed to be outside of the federal government's scope, and
33 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
34 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
35 H.R. 3835 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1933. Pub. L. No.73-10. 48 Stat. 31.
36 United States v. Butler. 297 U.S. 1. Supreme Court of the US. 1936. Legal Information
Institute, Cornell University Law School. Web. September 2012.
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in direct violation of the 10th amendment, breaching state's rights by way of the 
ever-popular commerce clause.
1938  Agricultural Adjustment Act: Revision & Extension
The described purpose of the post-Butler farm legislation was to regulate and 
manage conservation efforts and land use to create a “balanced flow” of commodity 
products between states and through exports. The 1938  Act at first seems to be 
primarily focused on conservation and ensuring healthy soil to continue good 
growth rates for the marketplace, but quickly starts throwing out significant dollar 
amounts to various crops and government agencies making it clear that the 
“national emergency” wasn't over by the President's standards. A safeguard was put 
in place ensuring that the act as a whole would still remain effective, regardless if 
one element was deemed unconstitutional and/or illegal per the courts37.
Acreage allotments became much more specific, in regulation and by crop. 
Corn had quite a few more standards placed on it, including the “tillable acreage, 
type of soil, topography, and crop rotation practices”. Section 102 outlined the way 
payments were to be m ade38. Still in the age of sharecropping, payments had to be
37 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 75th Congress, 3rd Session. H.R. 8505
Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31. The National 
Agricultural Law Center: United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012. 
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
38 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
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made proportionally to “owners, tenants, and sharecroppers”39. No total farm 
payment could exceed $10,000 in one year40.
In yet another expansion of the Secretary of Agriculture's power, he was now 
“authorized to make complaints to the Interstate Commerce Commission”41 in 
regards to rate changes for moving food throughout the market. There was now 
federal control over production, production levels, prices, exports, and the cost of 
moving product.
The 1938  AAA gifted to the American society the first major perm anent 
provision of farm legislation. The act was substantial, covering a vast am ount of food 
related issues including, but not limited to: m andatory loans, paym ent of benefits, 
production control, crop insurance, and soil conservation”42. Marketing quotas were 
now permissible when established the price support programs. Price support 
programs are a basic crutch of the food industry for years that supply isn't as high as 
the government and/or current demand would like it to be. Import duties and tariffs 
are in place until a set production demand is met. Producers get to sell for a higher 
price, without international competition43. The marketing quotas created a “more 
stringent means of controlling output”44, established by the Secretary of Agriculture.
39 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
40 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
41 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
42 Kwan 578
43 Edwards
44 Kwan 578
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Corn, defined as “field corn”45, would have loans made available when the 
year's crop yield was more than w hat was predicted, based on the previous year's 
figures. This would also occur if the price of corn fell below 75 percent of the parity 
price of that year46.
The 1938  Act also explicitly put in place consumer protection elements. The 
primary focus of these safeguards was to ensure production would m eet the 
demand of normal consumption, keeping with “consumer demands”47. Also, all 
acreage allotments and marketing quotas were to be made available to the public by 
the Secretary of Agriculture48.
1938  ensured also that the CCC49 would be around at least for another five 
years. Congressional members began to favor the CCC as a perm anent entity, not 
just one for emergency situations as originally envisioned50. The act also allowed the 
Secretary of Agriculture to not only set CCC rates, but from 1938-1940  to set various 
other commodities such as butter, figs, barley, wool, peanuts, and tobacco51.
Title V of the bill focused on crop insurance52. The idea behind the crop 
insurance was to “maintain farmers' purchasing pow er” and ensure “national 
welfare” by preventing disasters in commodity crop, especially w heat and corn
45 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
46 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
47 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
48 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
49 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
50 Kwan 578-579
51 Kwan 579
52 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
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crops. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation was created. This corporation would 
have U S$100,000,000 in “capital stock”53, with an oversight board hand-picked by 
the Secretary of Agriculture. As an added bonus, the FCIC was tax-exempt. The crop 
insurance program was present, but mostly experimental until 1 9 8 5 54 
1948 and 1949 Agricultural Acts
Although the 1 9 4 8 55 and 1949  acts were essentially the same, the 1949 bill 
enacted yet another provision to affect any and all forthcoming legislation. They 
were built on the established theory that high fixed price-supports56 were the best 
way to stabilize the market, not only through the Great Depression, but moving into 
the post-war years. Price supports, aiming for the 70-80 percent parity range, 
became mandatory for commodity crops, optional for others57.
Price supports were now determined by a num ber of factors. Interestingly, 
num ber eight was the “ability and willingness of producers to keep supply in line 
with demand”, yet another factor subject to the desires of the Secretary of 
Agriculture.
With all the excess unclaimed crops in federal storage, the federal 
government decided to put the crops to use in various other forms, as a means of
53 H.R. 8505 Agricultural Adjustment Act o f 1938. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
54 "History o f the Crop Insurance Program." History o f  the Crop Insurance Program. USDA Risk
Management Agency.
55 United States. Senate. 80th Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 80-897, 62 Stat. 1247. H.R. 5345
Agricultural Act o f 1948. The National Agricultural Law Center: United States Farm 
Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012. <http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
56 Kwan 579
57 Kwan 579
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preventing w aste58. The legislation dictated who had first pick. Access was granted 
to these three groups (in order of first choice to last): (Category 1) School lunch 
programs, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Federal, State, and local public welfare programs 
for Indians and other needy person; (Category 2): Private welfare organizations for 
the needy in the US; (Category 3): Private welfare for those organizations outside of 
the US59.
The way parity was calculated also changed. The new calculations added the
10 years, 1938-1948 , to the years used for base calculations, 1 9 1 0 -1 9 1 4 60. Two 
other items were also added into the process of creating a parity index: labor costs 
and payments to commodity producers61. In effect, since commodity growers could 
use this new formula when it was convenient62 for them, also known as a higher 
profit, the parity prices w ent up greatly benefiting those producers.
1970  Agricultural Act & Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973
Per usual, the prim ary purpose of any agricultural act was to extend the life 
of the previous structure. For the 1970 Act, the 1 954  Act was extended, as had
58 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 81st Congress, 1st Session. Pub. L. No. 81-439,
63 Stat 1051. H.R. 5345 Agricultural Act o f 1949. The National Agricultural Law Center: 
United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012. 
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
59 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 81st Congress, 1st Session. Pub. L. No. 81-439,
63 Stat 1051.
60 Kwan 579-580
61 Kwan 580
62 Kwan 580
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happened previously with the bill63. For the years 1971, 1972, and 1973 payments 
per person were not to exceed US$55,000. Corn, as a feed grain was subject to parity 
pricing (1 3 6 8 ), not to exceed the 90%  threshold.
1973 was a volatile time in the world market, just after the first oil embargo, 
the US stock m arket crash, and the Yom Kippur War. All of this together sparked a 
renewed interest in protecting commodities. Since there were food shortages 
abroad and inflation had also hiked up the prices at grocery stores64, the pressure 
was on to renew  the system.
In steps Secretary of Agriculture Butz. He demolished the previously used 
system “Ever-Normal Granary”, the mechanism to stabilize the grain market, opting 
instead for a more streamlined agricultural system. The new emphasis was on 
“fencerow to fencerow”65 crops and instead of controlling production levels, Butz 
encouraged “maintaining or increasing output”66.
The major change to the price-support system was the elimination of the 
parity index67. Instead, target prices and deficiency payments became the gold 
standard. Congress would set the target prices, and if the m arket prices ended up 
being under, farmers would get a deficiency paym ent to make up for the price
63 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 91st. Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 91-524,
84 Stat. 1358. H.R. 18546 Agricultural Act o f 1970. The National Agricultural Law 
Center: United States Farm Bills. Web. Accessed August 2012. 
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
64 Kwan 580
65 Kwan 580
66 Kwan 580
67 Kwan 581
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differences68. Low income households continued to be fed with excess commodities, 
and disaster relief payments became commonplace after the 1973 bill.
Food Security Act of 1985
The primary focus of the 1985  act was to “encourage exportation” of 
commodity crops through the Export Enhancement Program69. The focus of the 
program was especially exportation of corn, as feed grains70. This was to be 
encouraged as much as possible, as long as it didn't plummet the world prices. In 
line with Butz, the food system was growing. Instead of simply adding more price 
supports (although still in full swing), the idea was to export as much of the excess 
as possible.
Before the passage of this bill, the Reagan Administration had introduced 
ideas to substantially cut subsidization, but since farm finances w eren't in good 
shape in the 1980s, it just wasn't politically feasible. Also passed was Conservation 
Reserve Program71, whose purpose was to pay farmers not to farm, for production 
or soil preservation reasons.
1990: The 11 Part Act72.
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The dramatic increase in money floating around and the influence of 
government in the agricultural sector is evident simply in how long the bills 
gradually became. In part three of the 1990  bill, the focus was squarely on produce. 
Section 1303 commissioned a study to evaluate the “state of domestic fruits and 
vegetables”73. It specifically wanted to look into the “scientific and technological 
advances” in regards to genetically modified foods, biotechnology, and pesticides.
Labeling policies were central to the debate. The most crucial element of 
labeling was regulation of organic food. The “National Organic Production 
Program”74 outlined the program determining products qualifying organic foods for 
labeling. There would be federal standards, but each state had the right to create 
their own program for additional certification. The National Organic Standards 
Board would be the final word, appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
The standards for organic food were composed of three factors: no synthetic 
chemicals, granted a few provisions, no synthetic chemicals used on the land three 
years prior (excluding livestock), and that the handling is in compliance with the 
Board. These requirem ents would be in place starting October 1st, 1993.
The most incredible aspect of about the requirem ents was the exemption 
section for processed food. With approval of the National Organic Standards Board
<http://nationalaglawcenter.org/farmbills/#33>.
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and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the following was stated about 
processed foods, and how they could be labeled organic75:
Exemptions FOR PROCESSED Food.-Subsection (a ) shall not apply to agricultural
products that-
1. contain a t least 50 percent organically produced ingredients by weight,
excluding w ater and salt, to the extent that the Secretary, in consultation with 
the National Organic Standards Board and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, has determined to permit the word "organic" to be used on the 
principal display panel of such products only fo r the purpose of describing the 
organically produced ingredients; or
2. (2 ) Contain less than 50 percent organically produced ingredients by weight, 
excluding w ater and salt, to the extent that the Secretary, in consultation with 
the National Organic Standards Board and the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, has determined to permit the word "organic" to appear on the 
ingredient listing panel to describe those ingredients that are Organically 
produced in accordance with this title.
A group completely exempt from organic food labeling is any small farms 
that produce less than $5,000 of agricultural products annually76. Therefore, in a
75 United States. Cong. Senate. 101st Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359. 
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welcomed turnaround for the processed food industry, there were great incentives 
to hire the best lobbyists to ensure that any processed food, as long as it was 
accepted by the board and the Secretary, could be labeled organic. A win for the food 
industry was a big loss for the consumer unaware of this legislation.
1996: Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR)77
Regulation put forth in 1996  focused on letting farmers have greater 
flexibility in production and maneuvering with m arket demands, referred to as the 
“Freedom to Farm” law. This new version of subsidization was predicted to cost $47 
billion dollars from FY1996-FY2 0 0 2 78. Quickly destroying the progress of realistic 
and market-based commodity crops, Congress passed supplemental farm bills every 
year. The actual cost from 1996-2002  was $121  billion dollars79. As a part of this 
process, target prices were eliminated deemed to grant the most flexibility to 
farm ers80, due to the ability to decide w hat to be planted in a given growing season.
The farm population has been dwindling since the 1930s, but agriculture still 
remains one of the m ost heavily subsidized areas of the entire US economy81. An
76 United States. Cong. Senate. 101st Congress, 2nd Session. Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3359.
S. 2830 Food Agriculture Conservation and Trade Act o f 1990.
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easy push for legislators from farm states to swing urban-based legislators to be in 
favor of farm bills is th at food stamps are also included-- an im portant issue for 
urban areas. Also, lobbying for the farm industry is incredibly strong, increasingly 
able to push for higher USDA budgets.
2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act & 2008  Food, Conservation, and 
Energy Act
Farming won the political game again in 2002. The Bush Administration 
offered some mild reform options, but was quickly shut down in Congress. President 
Bush w ent so far to veto the 2002  farm bill, but was overridden. The “counter­
cyclical”82 price support system, the target-prices eliminated in the 1996  bill, which 
paid farmers directly for the difference between the pegged “target price” and the 
actual m arket value was implemented83. The program itself turned out to be 
incredibly expensive and illogical. Farmers are still able to time the marking of a 
target price at the peak of the year, and hold onto commodity crops (since they don't 
perish) until market prices are lower, then flood the market to obtain the best 
payout. The 2002  Act also increased existing programs to cover even more crops. 
Estimations at time of implementation for the next ten years was a whopping 74%  
increase in paym ents84 
Food Conservation and Energy Act: 2008.
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2 0 0 8  legislation ended in the same m anger85. Amazingly, even more farm 
subsidies were increased, and were implemented, despite another presidential veto. 
The bill passed in June, when the financial center's downward spiral started to 
become unavoidable, and the market was unstable. Essentially, it was perfect 
maelstrom for garnering support to protect the domestic food supply and major 
exports, the clear repetition, and public desire of avoidance, repeating itself.
Although the US did go over the fiscal cliff for a day, and all of farming 
America was up in arms about the possibility of not having a farm bill to thrive off 
of, the American Taxpayer Relief Act86 will continue the 2 008  Farm Bill until 
September 30th, 2 0 1 3 87.
Covering All Bases: Other Areas of US Government Expenditures in Farm 
Subsidization
Through decades of legislation, the US Federal Government covers virtually 
every angle of the farming industry. The basics for staying competitive that most 
industries in America m ust fund themselves are heavily covered and historically
85 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 110th Congress, 2nd Session. Pub L. No. 110
246, 122 Stat 1651. H.R. 6124 Food Conservation and Energy Act o f2008. The National 
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86 United States. Cong. House o f Representatives. 112th Congress, 1st 2nd Session. Pub. L. No.
112-240, 126 Stat. 2313. H.R. 8 American Taxpayer R elief Act o f  2012. GovTrack.: 
Congress. Web Accessed January 2013. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS 
112hr8enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr8enr.pdf>.
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funded more and more by federal funds. These areas include insurance, disaster aid, 
exports, and research.
Crop insurance programs have been growing significantly over the decades. 
The rationale is that it “reduces farmers' dependence on emergency bailouts”88. 
While insurance is a practical entity of any industry, the federal government's 
coddling of the food industry has created a living moral hazard. Congress is rapid 
when declaring states of emergencies for even relatively minor crop damage. Many 
farmers receive two payments when “emergencies” strike: one from their 
subsidized insurance plan and a second time from federal disaster relief funds89. 
With the intention of being able to reduce as-needed disaster-relief, the 2008  
insurance expansion implemented a perm anent disaster program. Crops that don't 
fall under the umbrella of insurance subsidization, Christmas trees, mushrooms, 
ginseng, and turf grasses90 now have their own perm anent disaster coverage, 
courtesy of the federal government Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program91. 
The constant attention to the “security” of the food industry reduces incentives for it 
to seek its own protection or play by the m arket rules.
In addition, the federal government pays the tab for approximately $3 billion 
dollars annually for USDA research92, $200 million for a range of activities under the
88Edwards
89 Edwards
90 Edwards
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Market Access Program for agricultural producers, including advertising 
campaigns93, and the Foreign Market Development Program, with an approximate 
annual spending of $35 million94. While government is commonly looked to for 
research and development costs, the intensity of involvement in agricultural 
marketing shows just the tip of the depth of the trench the government and the 
industry are in together.
93 USDA Fact Sheets
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I I I .  C o r n  a s  K i n g , F o o d  a s  F u e l : T h e  B i o f u e l  
D i l e m m a
Since 1933, corn has been one of the primary foci of the US government to 
ensure the security of the food industry. More and more, the emphasis has been on 
corn as a feed grain. Corn has become king in the United States, and consequentially 
globally. The US is the current prim ary “producer and exporter of corn grain”95. As 
of September 2010, eighty million acres of US farming land are dedicated to corn, 
with twenty percent of crop yield being exported96. In recent years, the use of corn 
has exploded; it's not simply a product for human consumption, but for feeding 
livestock, biofuels, plastics, adhesives, and even medicinal uses97.
Between 1995  and 2005, $37 billion US dollars w ent to corn subsidization98. 
The United States was not alone on the trend99, although it was 44.5%  of the m arket 
in 2 0 0 5 100. Brazil began producing 45.2%  of global biodiesel output from sugar cane 
and other parts of the world, particularly Europe, produced it from oil seeds101.
95 Simmons, Kay. "A Systems Approach to Corn." Agricultural Research 58.8 (2010):
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Projected EU rapeseed and US corn-maize biofuel production is to skyrocket in 
production over the next ten years102.
One of the m ost interesting developments in subsidization of food in the 
United States has been biofuels. Corn ethanol first appeared in 1974, just after the 
first oil shock, with a country ready to be rid of energy dependence. Scientists were 
able to take corn and turn it into a working fuel. The possibilities were endless, and 
the idea was loved by business, farmers, voters, environmental watchdogs, and 
politicians alike. It could be the future of renewable energy, and the US would have 
the capability to mass produce it. There were steps in Congress to aid the industry, 
as a replacem ent for the lead being phased out of gasoline, which was to be replaced 
by ethanol103. This trend continued rapidly, especially into the early 2000s as new
oil price spikes and a renewed determination to cut oil import dependencies on 
OPEC nations were reinforced by 9 /1 1  and other international tensions. Both sides 
of the aisle saw biofuels as the darling, of legislation and source of Midwest votes.
Legislation enacted in 2005  made biofuels look like a savior yet again. 
Encouraging domestic creation and use of ethanol, the US government provided a 
US$0.51 cent tax credit for ethanol-petrol users, and a trade tariff of US$0.54 cents
102 “2011 World Food Report”. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Banerjee, Arindam. "Food, Feed, Fuel: Transforming the Competition for 
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on any and all imported ethanol104. To make m atters even sweeter for corn 
producers, many states have their own layer of subsidization for the production and 
use of corn ethanol105.
Expanding EPA standards for increasing gas mileage and decreasing 
emissions for new cars also made biofuels incredibly attractive. This was increased 
even more when methyl-t-butyl (MTBE), a chemical additive in gasoline to help 
m eet emissions standards, was determined to be a “health risk” and removal of it 
from the m arket gradually began106. That m eant 7.5 billion liters107 of product 
needed to be replaced, and biofuels looked to be logical filler. While biofuels can be 
produced from a num ber of substances, including also heavily grown soy, corn thus 
far has remained king.
The three primary benefits asserted by pro-ethanol advocates are the 
reduction of oil importation, more farm revenue, and lower greenhouse emissions. 
However, the impact of corn in the global marketplace has had far greater and far 
more reaching effects in the highly interconnected, interdependent world market. 
The nature of the systemic environment creates economic and environmental risks 
associated with each of the primary goals.
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With a food supply so dependent on corn, and the subsidization of it, there is 
increasingly the potential for real competition between the food and fuel 
industries108. In 2007, corn feed prices were double w hat they had been the year 
before, partly because of the quick increase in demand for biofuels from both the 
private and public sectors109. Food producers are not only battling the needs of 
natural human consumption, both domestically and internationally, in a highly 
populated world, but now are indirect competition with energy as well110.
This competition invariably leads to the cost shift to the consumers, 
especially in the third-w orld111, where slight food price increases have far deeper 
and far more reaching consequences than in the global north. The bottom 
percentages of income globally spend 50-80% 112 of total household income on food. 
Any price spike can lead to not being able to eat or afford healthcare and education. 
Consequently, m alnutrition-related diseases can increase, potentially leading to 
more instability and a more aggravated population.
At the same time, production of w heat and rice has been much lower due to 
the profitability of biofuels. In 2000, approximately five percent of the total corn 
yield was being used for biofuels. By 2007, that num ber was twenty percent113. The 
land needed for corn production increased, decreasing production of w heat and rice.
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This problem is compounded even further given that w heat and rice are more and 
more often used for ethanol production as well. The Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2 0 0 7 114 called for the total renewable fuel standard to be 36 billion 
gallons, with 1 billion gallons being biodiesel, by 2022.
The hope and belief in biofuels quickly turned into a variety of consequences 
tougher for investors. Capital costs for plants, due to shortages, have increased 
approximately 80% , as of July 2 0 0 8 115. Engineers were harder and more expensive 
to hire, the price of corn began a steep upward climb, as did the machinery116 
needed to produce and keep up with growing demand. There are significant 
advantages to investing in biofuels, but it's a future's m arket that depends heavily 
on subsidization, dependable legislation, and natural production.
Biofuels have a major efficiency problem: they were, and are, heavily 
produced and subsidized in a highly political environment of high oil prices. The 
price of biofuels became its own monster, dependent on the price of oil. If oil prices 
decline, ethanol loses its profitability117. Ethanol production is driven by the m arket 
scarcity of oil, but the price of oil isn't only due to the free marketplace, either118. 
The delicate balance between oil, corn prices, and ethanol production is driven 
primarily by the government. Instead of the m arket generating ethanol production,
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it is driven by a few companies, their lobbyists, and the government. In a normal 
m arket situation, the bubble for biofuels would have already burst, unless new 
technology quickly developed. However, direct government support, especially in 
the U.S., ensured their presence and continued support.
Incentives remain readily available and highly attractive to the farming 
sector. In 2007, there was a $0.51 per gallon tax credit available for ethanol 
producers. Smaller quantity producers would receive an additional ten-cent per 
gallon tax reduction for their first 15 million gallons produced119. Biofuels, also 
protected by tariffs, circulate in an essentially competition-free market. In these 
terms, the consumer will lose. Considering how far reaching corn is throughout the 
US market, the consumer has the potential to lose far more than can ever be truly 
predicted, be it at the pump, the grocery store, or deficit-spending induced inflation 
and eventual decline of purchasing power.
The conundrum has become keeping production levels high enough to 
produce the ethanol to run the factories that create the ethanol while keeping food 
supply high enough. If biofuels are more subsidized, the price of corn skyrockets, as 
has been seen, and the need for proportional payments would decline. The 
aggregate government spending for corn, however, would still increase, due to the 
greater am ount of acreage dedicated to corn production. In 2007  alone, corn
119 Runge 41-53
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acreage jumped from 78 million to 92 million acres120, directly due to higher corn 
prices because of the dramatic increase in corn ethanol production. In the political 
game of today, corn subsidy removal is a task few, if any, in Washington are willing 
to take on.
The bigger problem facing biofuel production is that it is unlikely to be 
enough to be a true “solution” many believed it could be. If all the possible farmland 
in the world were used to grow high-yield crops for biofuels, only 20%  of current 
energy demand would be satisfied121. This is partly due to lagging technology and 
inefficiencies, and partly due to the ideological pipe dream from politicians, 
environmentalists, producers, and voters. OECD studies show that it would take 
70%  of Europe's farmland growing for biofuels to barely reach 10%  of 
transportation fuel dem and122.
There are plenty of other materials that would be useful, and better, for 
ethanol production than corn, like grass and woodchips123; but the research and 
development along with the crucial lobbying aren't there like they have been for 
corn. This is partially due to the dynamics of reactionary democracies, particularly 
in the U.S. electoral system. Party polarization, ram pant across the country, and 
presidential elections coming down to a few swing states, create an environment
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perfect for pork-barreling on all levels of government. Iowa124, as a swing state, and 
a major corn producer, has benefited greatly from its electoral sway. Keeping the 
present system is an easy political sell to keep Iowa happy and producing for both 
sides of the aisle.
The subsidization of corn ethanol production would probably be an easier 
pill to swallow if it w asn't a blatant form of corporate welfare and the squashing of 
competition. Archer Daniels Midland Company, thanks to significant lobbying 
efforts, is the largest producer of ethanol in the US125. Starting as a small factor in 
the market, by 1980 it was a major player in corn due to the dramatic increase in the 
use of corn syrup. By 2 0 0 6  ADM produced the m ost ethanol in the US, four times 
more than the second largest producer126.
The sheer am ount of government demands for higher production, coupled 
with the federal checkbook, has had plenty of companies attem pting to jump into 
the game; the result is higher capital costs. The third player, aside from the 
government and big corn producers, in the growing demand for biofuels has been 
the environmentalists pushing for alternative energy sources. Many investors, 
producers, politicians, and environmentalists are still willing to take the risk despite
124 Bhat 30
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the negatives that have surfaced127. The difference between many new-fuel 
advocates in the past and today is that they are throwing their own money, by the 
millions, into new ethanol companies128. Their investment essentially ensures their 
support for more government support, and therefore less likely to shift support to 
more viable options that could develop in the future.
The end result of the biofuel subsidization epidemic has already created 
consequences reaching far outside of the United States. Again, the price of biofuels 
and oil is inextricably linked in current markets. Countries in the developing world 
which are also oil im porters will be the hardest hit by skyrocketing of food prices129. 
Mexico City, in 2007, am idst high corn prices, saw severe rioting over increased 
prices. The main food consumption, especially for their large, impoverished class, is 
tortillas, a corn based product, logically skyrocketed in price, nearly doubling, as 
corn went up130.
The first generation of biofuels, still most predominantly used, is the most 
inefficient. There is promise with the next generations, but they are still in 
developmental stages. In addition, the United States has been criticized for their 
corn-ethanol because of the high emissions that come from the manufacturing
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mechanisms along with the destruction of land131. The environmental damage of 
first-generation biofuels, at current predicted production levels, is seemingly 
unavoidable.
The more positively promoted and subsidized biofuels become, the more 
land that will be deforested for growing soy, and especially corn for ethanol 
production, therefore creating more carbon dioxide. Soy is an incredibly profitable 
product to grow, and any void in the m arket would most likely lead to greater 
production elsewhere to fill the m arket demand, especially in South America132.
Land and resources that may be needed in the future is being used now to fill the 
desire of government to accomplish two outcomes: publicly respond to 
environmental issues and please the corn industry.
Biofuels in the end could counter-act the very premise of their creation. The 
International Food Policy Research Institute, in August 2010, estimated that the end 
carbon-emission impact, direct and indirect, would be greater due to biofuel usage 
than current petrol consumption. They describe the benefits as “ambiguous” and 
highly dependent on “param eters governing land use change”133.
Land use changes, taking natural land and converting it to crop-growing land, 
is the area of biofuels with significant carbon-emission impact. Specifically in the
131 2011 Global Food Policy Report. Rep. International Food Policy Research Institute, 23 Apr.
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U.S., corn and soy typically were on an alternating growing schedule, since soy adds 
nitrogen, which is necessary for corn grow th134. However, because of the enticing 
nature of corn, the rotation isn't occurring, and more nitrogen-based fertilizer is 
being used. This leads to a greater runoff problem than already existed135.
Further, carbon caps in OECD countries can lead indirectly to the increase in 
carbon-emissions in other countries136. Exporting carbon-emissions still leads to a 
negative aggregate of higher carbon emissions. Current methods of production of 
corn ethanol creates three elements: ethanol, distillers dried grains with soluble 
(DDGS) (used as animal feed), and carbon dioxide, approximately one third each. 
Prices in DDGS were a tug of w ar between soy and corn prices, but recent years have 
seen corn become the far more dominant determ inant in prices.
Another major factor that has been a big attributor to government support 
and funding of biofuels is the way energy costs and uses are calculated. Many of the 
statistics don't include animal feed or carbon dioxide gas137. The total energy costs, 
i.e. a “cradle to grave” calculation138, the “off-set” pieces of the calculation are a 
significant factor in determining the true ability of biofuels to reduce carbon 
emissions139.
134 Runge 41-53
135 Runge 41-53
136 Msangi, Siwa. "Biofuels and a Green Economy." Biofuels and a Green Economy. International
Food Policy Research Institute, 17 May 2012. Web.
137 Anslow 213
138 Anslow 214
139 Anslow 214
39
The transportation of ethanol and biofuels is another nightmare, in cost and 
environmental impact. Biofuels, especially ethanol, cannot be transported by the 
existing pipeline infrastructure. Instead of being able to ship biofuels directly to the 
processing markets, blending in to the refined gasoline, ethanol and ethanol blends 
m ust be transported through truck, rail, and barge140, all of which have significant 
fuel cost141. The deluge of increased production, and consequently demand, has 
already been causing problems for the transport industry, adding a further 
limitation of ethanol.
The 2 011  G20 summ it142 explicitly had biofuels as a part of the discussion of 
food security issues. They especially focused on biofuels in relation effects on food 
prices and encouraging adjustments to domestic policy mandating increased 
production of biofuels in relation to food supply. However, the summit was careful 
to not explicitly emphasize the links between biofuels and increased food prices, due 
to the heavy producers of biofuels, i.e. Brazil, and heavy food im porters sensitive to 
global food prices, i.e. China, in attendance143. The discussion also revolved around 
internal policies, including US and EU tariff protectionist policies against im porters 
of ethanol.
Brazil actually became a net im porter of biofuels from the US in 2011. Due to 
the combination of consistently increasing output from US producers, backed by
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government initiative, and the flexibility of Brazilians plants to craft sugar cane for 
food or for biofuels, compounded with increased sugar demand in India, the biofuel 
m arket became much less competitive in 2011. Although China in 2001  had 
intensively started to bolster ethanol production, with four state-owned plants in 
operation, the rising of domestic grain prices caused them to quickly slow 
production. In 2007, China was the third-largest net biofuel producer in the world, 
but production had been slowed by government policy capping the am ount of cereal 
“feed grains” that could be designated for biofuel production144.
Environmental impact was the second major topic discussed in relation to 
biofuel production, tied in with farm-land use especially. The EU and US lead the 
way being the largest consumers and producers of biodiesel, but the rising 
environmental costs tied in with food price increases set up future debates and 
policy to be framed at least partly around environmental issues145. If not the 
sometimes unpopular environmental concerns, the debate comes down to the 
question of energy-efficiency and how much is truly garnered for all the effort and 
money spent on biofuel production and distribution.
While biofuels are not discredited internationally; there has been a call for 
more sustainable practices and greater attention to new technology. This was 
introduced through calls for on more specific guidelines on carbon-emission
2011 Global Food Report
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comparison to other fuel sources. For example, there was a committee established 
focused on creating a certification process similar to that of “fair-trade coffee”, 
intent on reducing the “carbon intensity of biofuels”146.
The findings of the 2 0 1 1  Global Food Report conclude that if prices continue 
to increase in 2012  as they did in 2011, US biofuel producers will have significant 
profit increases; but livestock producers will have significant feed-grain price 
increases to match. In order for feed-grain prices not to rise, ethanol made from 
second-generation products, e.g. switch grass147, may be a way to ameliorate, but 
not solve, price increases.
Biofuels have the potential to be a viable part of the future of energy. 
However, the bold moves by government to subsidize without fully understanding 
long-term consequences have made biofuels unattractive at the systemic level, and 
in many ways a m irror image of food policy in the United States. The pervasive 
attitude of technology as a savior shines bright in the legislation and sponsored by 
conglomerate producers.
However, until biofuels are a part of the normalized, competitive, 
marketplace, they are economically unviable. The dramatic increase in US role in the 
biofuels market, especially with other countries opting out for various reasons, 
could very well be said to have been an intended, direct consequence of US policy. In
2011 Global Food Report
147 2011 Global Food Report
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the United States, the intense focus on output, with biofuel production significantly 
up, takes away from the focus on energy and food policy. Creating another 
essentially state-run system to compete with the heavily state influenced food 
industry clearly isn't the end solution, and isn't promising in long-term, nor the 
short-run either.
The connection between food, oil, and land use create a complex network of 
subsidization and interdependencies that ultimately hurt consumers everywhere, 
but especially in the developing world. If ethanol production were left to the market, 
it's possible that the technology could be better, since it wouldn't be tied to 
primarily to corn with so much of its weight, and the other viable options, even new 
ones, could have a chance.
It is noteworthy that biofuels were present in two major sections of the 
American Taxpayer Relief Act, Energy and Agriculture. Funding is continuing and 
expanding to include research for cellulosic biofuels, produced from lignocellulose, a 
major component in most plants. This means more funding for switch grass and 
woodchips. However, corn was still the big winner with the continuation of their 
major tax credits. The fact that government research money seems to be never- 
ending for biofuel production leaves little motivation for the private sector to be 
working on anything but subsidized sources of energy. The moral hazard that 
companies will continue to work on inefficient, at least in the long run, energy
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sources instead of real innovation and market-based solutions is a potential 
negative consequence for taxpayers and global citizens.
Clearly, these products have a lot of potential, but government intervention 
in clean energy hasn't proven to be generally successful in the United States. 
Projects such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 1 6 0 3 148, that 
invested in various forms of clean energy, has turned up many failed projects, 
mostly extensions of corporate welfare, encouraging the status-quo.
As prudent as the idea is to keep searching for new sources of ethanol, with 
food and w ater being put in jeopardy, and a lot of petroleum going into the 
production and distribution of these products, it's time to reevaluate the role of 
government. There is a lot of money to be made in developing the next big source of 
energy, but as long as the government is dictating who and what will be the winner, 
the results are unlikely to be positive outcomes.
148 Sullivan, Molly A. "1603: Corporate Welfare by Another Name." Web log post. Energy Policy 
Center. Independence Institute, 27 Apr. 2012. Web.
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IV. G e n e t i c a l l y  m o d i f i e d / e n g i n e e r e d  f o o d :
E v o l u t i o n , R e g u l a t i o n , a n d  C o n t r o l
Genetically Modified Foods: All the best intentions
Genetic changes in food are a part of evolution. Natural changes and hybrids 
of plants, both naturally and through careful seed selection by farmers, have been 
occurring since the beginning of time, but with the discovery of DNA, there was new 
opportunity for humans to be able to modify organisms149. Agriculture hooked on to 
this new technology- seeing it as a way to lower the need for pesticides, increase 
yields, and increase the quality of food on the superm arket shelf. The modifications 
could be done with unbelievable speed, and with specific intentions playing out in a 
single generation.
Three of the m ost popular ways historically to modify food are radiation 
breeding, embryo rescue, and transposon mutagenesis150. These manners of 
modification require no regulation or safety tests prior to their release on the 
m arket151, due to their pervasive nature and general positive outcomes throughout
149 Wholers, Anton. "Regulating Genetically Modified Food." Politics and the Life Sciences29.2
(2010): 17-39. Print.
150 Harlander, Susan. "Safety Assessments and Public Concern for Genetically Modified Food
Products: The American View." Toxicologic Pathology 30.1 (2002): 132-34. Print.
151 Harlander 132
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history. True genetic engineering changes to food “allows for the transfer of a few 
genes in a much more precise, controllable, and predictable m anner”152.
Immediate suspicions were raised, especially outside of the US, of the 
potential crossing of a threshold: how much influence can man truly have over 
nature without causing great harm 153? With the ability for humans to genetically 
engineer food came a shift from “natural hazards” to “manufactured hazards”154. 
Repercussions now have a direct link to human causation. Biological engineers 
believe that because the environment is so much more controlled than typical 
genetic changes to food that it is an inherently better mechanism, even though it 
goes much more rigorous safety examinations.
GMO legislative framework was established in 1992, with precursors in the 
1990  legislation defining organic foods. Policy makers believed that the potential 
economic and social benefits outweighed the potential risks enough to push the 
modified foods to the market. The USDA, EPA, and FDA were the agencies deemed 
capable of controlling safety and administration. Safety of GMO foods was based on 
the “substantial equivalence” of food already in place155. To put a genetically 
modified tomato on the market, it would have to have the equivalent of a tomato,
152 Harlander 132
153 Wohlers 17
154 Maria Rosa Martinez-Larranaga, et al. "Risk Analysis And GM Foods: Scientific Risk
Assessment." European Food &  Feed Law Review 4.4 (2009): 235-250. Academic 
Search Premier. Web. 24 Apr. 2013.
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nutritionally, by the level of toxins, and allergens156. All GMO products on the m arket 
have been determined to not be “inherently less safe” than non-modified 
counterparts157.
The policy differences between the European Union and the United States 
can be partly attributed to the general stances on technology, with the US being the 
far more accepting. Policy makers in the US looked at the cost-benefit analysis of 
GMO products158, seeing the high-yield possibilities and more food on the m arket as 
better for consumers. In the EU, on the other hand, precaution reigns suprem e159, 
typical of their tendency to lean on history and problems that have occurred in the 
past. For the EU, there simply isn't enough data that the food is the equivalent to 
allow it to be largely available to the public.
The idea that technology is a savior, and would develop quickly enough to 
truly solve pressing domestic and global issues, entered the US food m arket fairly 
easily. The possibility of technology solving the problems of food quality and 
quantity was a satisfying thought and could be really im portant reality once GMO 
foods became readily available.
The core of the differences between US and EU policy are two prim ary safety 
concerns: allergens and toxins160. There isn't significant correlation, currently, to
156 Harlander 132
157 Harlander 133
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real risk in humans to w arrant their complete dismissal. Part of the issue of research 
is how little time GMO products have really been dominant in the market. Their 
ascent was unbelievably quick, but the full effects of a life eating primarily GMO 
foodstuffs can't truly be understood or declared until those born around 1995  up to 
the present are well into their adult lives. There hasn't been exposure long enough 
to secure hard evidence about how GMO foods affect humans.
The problem with regulation of GMO and determining policy is that we 
simply don't know the long-term effects. What the impact will be on biodiversity 
and the systemic ecosystems could be positive (not likely according to most 
academics), could be negative, or anything in between or more extreme. The general 
consensus is that the reduction of biodiversity could have major consequences, from 
single crops being wiped out completely to the development of superbugs from crop 
modifications that could transfer to hum ans161.
20 0 6  saw spiking of intermingling of GMO and non-GMO crops. Illegal 
planting in Mexico and Japan especially of GMO crops have seen worldwide spread 
of GMO crops to places like the UK, France, and Germany who have specific bans on 
the products162.
Regulation: Keeping up with the Times
161 Falkner, Robert. "The Global Biotech Food Fight." The Brown Journal o f  WorldAfairsXVI.1
(2007): 99-110.
162 Falkner
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The debate about the safety of genetically engineering crops dates back to 
the 1970s, when rDNA technology, the connection between two different pieces of 
DNA, was discovered in 1 9 7 3 163. The potential for solutions and possible problems 
was immediately recognized, so much so that the US National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) created an advisory committee to oversee and regulate the technology. The 
USDA, EPA, and FDA quickly followed with their own regulations164. Once the idea of 
engineering crops came into play, there was serious consideration in the United 
States and abroad about various environmental, health, and potential regulatory 
issues brought into the discussion165.
The OECD was the first to define biotechnology in 1982, and by 1983 NIH 
had released their risk assessm ent plan166. The first bioengineered product released 
into the environment was ice-minus bacterium 167, bacteria reducing the frost on 
plants, the potential for crops to be able to withstand non-optimal weather. There 
were studies published in 1983 about engineered tobacco, and the future super 
GMO seed producer, Monsanto, had engineered petunias to have resistance to 
kanamycin168, an antibiotic, as a “m arker” of the engineering, without real purpose.
163 McHughen, Alan, and Stuart Smyth. "US Regulatory System For Genetically Modified
[Genetically Modified Organism (GMO), Rdna Or Transgenic] Crop Cultivars." Plant 
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This is part of the concern of antibiotic resistance in plants and livestock 
transferring to humans, creating superbugs we are incapable of curing169.
The sheer speed in which the developments were occurring demanded 
equally firm companion policy for government to remain prevalent and effective. 
The White House established committee, Office of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP), recommended that the new technology be regulated primarily by the 
finished product, not by the process to make them, because they believed rDNA was 
not a significant risk by itself170.
The USDA, EPA, and FDA were each given specific monitoring tasks, all 
looking out for risk factors. The USDA was to take the lead on ensuring GMO 
agriculture didn't harm the rest of the sector, FDA regulating the potential th reat to 
feed and food supply, and the EPA to evaluate products modified as pesticides171. 
The divide-and-conquer method of approaching GMO products was well received. 
Scientific panels had consensus on three basic principles: modification can lead the 
way to hazard, both by human engineering and traditional breeding, biotechnology 
isn't more of a threat than the traditional manners of breeding, and that risk 
evaluation should be focused on the finished, marketed product172.
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Bringing a newly bred crop to the m arket isn't a complex process in the US. 
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1 9 9 4 173 allows cultivators that can produce a 
“genetically stable genotype”174 over several generations, taking into account soil, 
yield potential, and reaction to current relevant diseases, the product will probably 
be able to make it to the market. As long as the plant isn't a “noxious weed” or 
interfering with general biosafety (the two overarching ways to get rejected), 
genetically engineered food permits are attainable. After it was discovered, and 
publically broadcast, that there were blatant field trials without permits in 2003, the 
Animal Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) strengthened the regulations, with 
larger buffer zones around trials and longer trial periods.
Deregulation of the system began in 1992, where plants deemed benign 
environmentally could be released commercially175. In 1993, Flavr Savr, the 
modification that keeps tomatoes ripe, a viral disease-resistant squash, GE cotton, 
and a GE soybean from Monsanto were the first GMO products placed on the non­
regulated status list. By 2006, 100 genetically engineered products had made the 
non-regulated list.
Defining "organic" in the new biotechnology food world
Mostly due to the pervasive nature of GMO foodstuffs in the market, there are 
misunderstandings in the mass public and huge scientific problems identifying
173 McHughen 2
174 McHughen 3
175 McHughen 6
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GMOs, their consequences, and exactly how “organic” or “modified” a product is176. 
Consumers that prefer to buy organic generally would describe organic food very 
ambiguously, such as “better for you” or “doesn't have chemicals”177. The typical 
organic purchaser buys thinking of themselves and their family, unaware of the 
greater policy and global effects at play178.
The majority of “organic” food purchased by consumers in the US is not from 
mom and pop style farms. They are actually from subsidiary productions of the 
conglomerate agricultural producers179, the same companies stocking the non- 
organic section at your local grocery chain. This stems from two realities facing 
farming today180. First of all, it's usually part of a large operation, looking for a boost 
in sales by dedicating a portion of their large farming area to organic production, 
with no intention of adapting the process as a whole. The second reality is that most 
farmland is rented. When farmland is rented, there isn't a big personal push to 
retain soil and practice sustainably.
The pervasive nature of GMO food in the US is staggering; as of 2010, the 
total num ber of genetically modified corn, cotton, and soy on the m arket totals 90% . 
Corn is at 86%  genetically modified181, soy and cotton are both at 93% . The
176 Chrzan, Janet. "The American Omnivore's Dilemma: Who Constructs “Organic” Food?" Food
and Foodways 18.1 (2010): 81-95. Print.
177 Chrzan 82
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181 "USA: In 2010, More Genetically Modified Crops Once Again." GMO Compass. GMO
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difficulty in distinguishing GMO and organic food begins here: when 90  percent of 
corn is genetically modified, all the potential by-products are therefore modified as 
well. Common corn derivatives used in processed food are corn oil, cornstarch, corn 
flour, cornmeal, dextrose, and the ever-popular high-fructose corn syrup182, all a 
family of high volume presence on the shelf. Establishing a chain-of-custody for 
corn based derivatives in processed foods becomes incredibly difficult, especially 
when considering that corn products will change hands an estimated 14-17 times, 
ending with an estimated 70% -80%  of processed foods having GMO products183.
Since labeling of GMO food is a voluntary process, and producers willing to 
go through a labeling process are typically those not genetically modifying their 
food, it's a demanding process to establish that all products in the distribution chain 
can remain pure of modified products and by-products. Natural cross-pollination of 
genetically modified seeds and non-GMO seeds is virtually unavoidable184. Because 
of this, non-GMO labels typically mean that there will be a presence of genetically 
modified food, but only up to a certain threshold set by the producer. The bigger 
problem than attaining certification in the movement of products is the testing for 
GMO products. The technology isn't great, with many resulting in false positives and 
negatives when testing for GMO presence. A 2 001  study showed that 16 of 20 tested 
items labeled non-GMO had, in fact contained GMOs.
Compass, 30 June 2010. Web.
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The cost of testing, and lack of accuracy across the board, is quickly passed 
on to the consumer. Since the conception of GMO food products in the marketplace, 
the FDA has made it clear that foods that are not “materially different”185 from their 
“natural” counterpart do not require labeling. The FDA believes that labeling non- 
GMO products would inherently be misleading, especially if there are no other 
versions of that food that are bio-engineered and due to the non-trustw orthy nature 
of current testing mechanisms186. Regardless, companies are labeling products, even 
in light of the odds that the food has been GMO “contaminated” are very high.
The nature of creating non-GMO food products in the United States is tenfold 
more difficult given how the food industry has been riding the wave of GMO foods. 
Companies generally do not have the separate storage capabilities (or desire to do 
so) due to the fluctuation and hard-to-predict nature of the non-GMO food
m arket187.
Inefficiencies and Deficiencies: How the subsidized structure picking corn as 
king made the consumer the loser
Looking at the most basic element of food subsidization in the US, money, it's 
clear that staple crops like wheat, soybeans, and particularly corn, are the big 
winners. Inherently, there is less acreage, and less incentive to grow fruits and
185 Harlander 133
186 Harlander 134
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vegetables188. In the general superm arket setting, excluding the extreme so-called 
“food deserts” in urban settings with low access to fresh fruits and vegetables, most 
of this disparity is made up for through imports, especially from Mexico.
Corn is used heavily in many, if not most of the types of additives that make 
food easiest to sell, by making them taste good. With corn so subsidized, and so 
prevalent, of course it's used heavily in feeding livestock and for these additives. The 
price gap between high-sugar and high-fat foods, with many corn and soy 
derivatives, makes a theoretical case that Agricultural policy in the US can be 
considered a contributing factor to rising obesity189. Obesity is heavily associated 
with poverty190. The fat foods are cheaper, and poor people eat the cheaper, heavier 
fat content foods. Obviously, there are many other factors associated, but the simple 
costs of healthy versus heavily processed, corn-likened foods isn't a factor to be 
dismissed.
Soft drinks rely heavily on the corn-starch-derived sweetener, high fructose 
corn syrup (HFCS). Europe escaped this trend because they traditionally used beet 
sugar for sweeteners, and created legislation promoting beet sugar to protect their 
farm ers191. Instead of the traditional cane sugar being used, this synthetic sw eetener
188 Fields, Scott. "The Fat of the Land." Environmental Health Perspectives 112.14 (2004): 820­
23. Print.
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use jumped 1000%  in use between 1970 and 1 9 9 0 192. 40%  of all sweeteners (not 
non-calorie versions) in the US are based on HFCS193.
Although the research is still just correlative and not universally accepted, 
there are many in the scientific community questioning if HFCS, since it is synthetic, 
and tastes sweeter, than traditional sugar, could be an underlying cause of obesity in 
the US, due to an inability of the body to process the synthetic m aterials194. Would 
this product have reached the US m arket had it not been for substantial corn 
subsidization? Probably. The difference is, it may not have become the most 
prevalent. If corn w asn't chosen as king and other sweeteners could have still been 
active on the market.
The primary way in which the public loses, however, isn't necessarily in the 
quality of product itself, but in how little choice the consumer is given. Due to the 
ease of corporations being able to pump their modified products into the market, 
without any form of labeling, average consumers truly have no way of knowing 
w hat is in their food. The faith that because a food is “substantially equivalent” to its 
non-engineered counterpart, and that it won't have potential long-term 
consequences, is a serious gamble; and one that people should deliberately have the 
option to decide for themselves.
192 Fields 823
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V. C o n g l o m e r a t e  c o n t r o l , G o v e r n m e n t  A l l o w a n c e
Government: The Trust and the Trust-Buster
The U.S. federal government has created a strong connection over the last 
eighty plus years with the food industry. Food is treated as a m atter of national 
security, and the industry is coddled in every facet financially and legally. Now that 
the food industrial machine is bigger than even Secretary Earl Butz could have 
imagined, is it possible to break the dependency? Trust laws are complicated with 
decades of standing legislation supporting conglomerates and mass production. 
Consumers are given an illusion of choice when it's actually the same few producers 
at every chain grocery store.
Archer Daniels Midland Corporation 
Development
There are plenty of companies, especially conglomerates, taking fully 
advantage of the heavily regulated and subsidized food m arket in the US, both 
directly and indirectly. Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADMC) is one of the most 
blatant examples. ADMC is known for throwing money at both sides of the aisle, and 
reaping the benefits in huge protections in the forms of tariffs and domestic 
subsidization.
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ADM has managed to become one of the dominant actors through its 
lobbying efforts and commercialized, especially through TV ads, depiction of it as a 
decent corporation. For subsidization of sugar or ethanol products, there is little 
cost and effort for ADM195. Described as “one of the great financial ‘switch hitters' of 
American politics”196, either side of the aisle that will provide subsidization gets the 
monetary support. From 1979  to 1995, former chairman Dwayne Andreas, personal 
family members, and ADM Corporation donated US$4 million dollars to both 
congressional and presidential candidates and the Republican and Democratic 
National Committees197.
Sugar
U.S. policy in regard to im port quotas and price supports induce conditions 
that ADM is able to produce high-fructose corn syrup in incredibly profitable 
conditions198. ADM became a big player in the sugar industry in 1974, as world 
sugar prices peaked199. After investm ent capital was put into development of HFCS 
by ADM, the company was able to produce nine times more HFCS than with 
previous technology. The price of sugar fell dramatically, from per-pound prices of 
65 cents to 8 cents200. Paying politicians on the Democratic and Republican side,
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along with retaining a heavy portion of the primary lobbying force in sugar, The 
American Sugar Alliance, paid off with the 1981  sugar bill201.
Misleading advertisem ent to the public, alleging that the US was home of the 
cheapest sugar prices, which actually was a false statement, prom pted a domestic 
debate on the subject. The idea was circulated widely in new spaper ads, and 
allowed the passage of the Sugar Act without much public outcry202. The program is 
brilliantly designed to look as though it's not even a part of the federal budget. A 
quota system was established, effectively eliminating cheaper imports of sugar, 
creating a constant, artificial sugar shortage in the US that consumers pay for at the 
checkout stand203.
When the 1981  Sugar Bill was enacted, sugar sold for 22 cents per pound, 
when the global price was approximately 4.5 cents per pound204. Defendants of the 
program say that it protects consumers from unpredictable global price fluxuations. 
However, the price floor set by the government, w ithout a price celling, allows sugar 
prices to skyrocket, but not fall205- an inherent win for companies like ADM but an 
inherent loss for consumers' denial to open markets. The relative stability of sugar 
prices, lacking major spikes, is simply because the price is already spiked up.
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Sugar, especially in the quantity now being produced in the US, isn't 
economical. Importing sugar from countries with the natural climate for it takes up 
land that could be better suited for growing other products. Excessive growing of 
sugar in the Florida Everglades, which includes serious draining of w ater and the 
subsequent high levels of chemicals needed to create the right growing 
environment, has led to the destruction of much of the area206.
The effects on third-world nations, primarily in South America, are 
astronomical. From 1975-1995, sugar imports were cut by 8 0 % 207, seemingly great 
for American producers. However, while the economies of Central America and the 
Philippines (among others) were economically demolished, 17 of the United State's 
largest sugar producers received over half of all government subsidizations. No 
competition and blatant corporate welfare cost American consumers $3 billion 
dollars per American sugar producer from 1 9 8 0 -1 9 9 5 208.
Corn
In the late 1980s, then CEO Dwayne Andreas began to hail corn ethanol as a 
savior, as a form of national security, both environmentally and dependency on 
Middle Eastern oil. Continually supporting those that supported ethanol production, 
ADM was able to jump to the forefront, with gas tax-breaks and much R&D
206 Bovard
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supported by the government, despite adam ant warnings that corn ethanol had 
dozens of potential environmental hazards and was cost-prohibitive.
ADM spent $1,700,000 and $970,000  in lobbying in 2 011  and 2012, 
respectively. For the 2012  election cycle, ADM put out $575,880  as a part of their 
investment. They spent on both sides of the isle, including heavy contributions to 
both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. It appears that the election didn't even really 
matter, for they were so incredibly invested- everywhere. Their returns would be 
safe regardless of future election outcomes. Thirteen of their fourteen lobbyists 
previously worked in government, and seven members of congress own shares in 
ADM. Everyone but the average consumer has a financial stake in their success; 
subsidization and regulation fits their needs.
ADM used its government influence back in the 1970s to support their own 
interests. The 1973 declaration of Secretary Earl Butz to ensure food supply and 
grow, grow, grow, and was heavily influenced by Andreas. Illegal money was heavily 
flowing into the Nixon Administration, as came to light during the Watergate 
investigation209. The money continued during Carter Administration, when Senator 
Hubert Humphrey's chief of staff David Gartner's children received $72,000 in ADM
209 Krakoff, Charles. "Starvation, Obesity, and Corporate Welfare: Archer Daniels Midland and
U.S. Policy." Starvation Obesity and Corporate Welfare Archer Daniels Midland and US 
Policy Comments. Emerging Markets Outlook, 13 Oct. 2010. Web.
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stock between 1975  and 1 9 7 7 210. David Gartner was the head of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission until these “gifts” were discovered.
The money continued through campaign after campaign, and was especially 
heavy for Bob Dole's presidential campaign. Although unsuccessful, Senator Dole 
still held much weight in the senate, ensuring the lucrative $0.54 tax credit per- 
gallon of ethanol was passed, critical since ADM produces 60%  (2 0 1 0 ) of all US 
produced ethanol.
Monsanto 
History
Monsanto technically has been around since 1 9 0 1 211, although their focus 
has shifted quite dramatically since the beginnings of the company. A chemical 
company, whose first chemical was an artificial sweetener, continued to grow and 
pushed into the agricultural chemical world in 1945. In 1960, the Agricultural 
division of the company quickly started producing commercialized herbicides. Their 
m ost famous, Roundup was on the m arket in 1976. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, heavy research and development helped them create the first genetically 
modified products, culminating in their 1987  groundbreaking, first in the industry, 
biotechnology field testing. The company continued to develop and patent seeds and
210 Krakoff
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62
agricultural chemicals, purchasing other chemical and biological research 
companies along the way.
The 1990s were filled with insect-resistant research and market-ready 
products. In 2000, Monsanto became a “new” company after their merger with 
Pharmacia Corporation. Through the present, the company continues to buy and sell 
related companies. Monsanto is no longer a chemical company, but a producer of 
agricultural goods and products that help in the process. The progression into the 
conglomerate they have become was a slow one, a legal one, and now a painful 
reality of bad public policy, patent laws, and legal battles.
The true core of the problem with Monsanto, when the general population 
doesn't clearly hear in many popular documentaries, is that w hat they are doing is 
completely legal. Some of their scare tactics, legal attem pts at pushing non- 
Monsanto seed farmers out of the business, are potentially illegal, and they have 
received legal ramifications, but in the grand scheme of things, it's still the 
government that is responsible at the end of the day.
The Seed and the Rules 
The advances in technology and resulting products Monsanto has created are 
almost incomprehensible. Although not a t the yield rates genetically modified foods 
were anticipated to be, their advances in herbicides and pesticides successes are 
partly due to the sheer am ount of food available globally.
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There are plenty of chemicals to kill bugs produced by other companies that 
produced alongside Monsanto. The ability for Monsanto to manipulate the core of 
living organisms so effectively elevated them to be a primary producer of 
agricultural products. The Roundup Ready seeds, designed to be used with 
Roundup, the herbicide that controls a variety of unwanted plant species, are far 
and away the m ost popular and successful. Monsanto claims using the products 
together can clear “an entire field of weeds and still produce bountiful soybean and 
cotton crops”212.
This “miracle”, however, comes with a very serious condition: the Monsanto 
Technology/Stewardship Agreement. The primary, and most significantly litigated 
part of the agreement, is that farmers may not practice seed saving. Naturally 
manipulating generations of seeds allowed farmers to be autonomous and 
successful, better able to determine and plan for the following season's yields.
Patent Laws213
At their philosophical core, patent laws are designed to promote free- 
enterprise, to encourage new development, and to spur economic growth. They are 
m eant to protect hard-earned research and the ability to sell the product without 
generic competition- at least for a time period, depending on the product.
212 Ma, Michelle. "Anticipating and Reducing the Unfairness of Monsanto's Inadvertent
Infringement Lawsuits: A Proposal to Import Copyright Law's Notice-and Takedown 
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There are two crucial elements at odds with one another when it comes to 
patenting seeds in the current context of Agriculture in the United States. First of all, 
Monsanto puts its own capital into research and development, approximately $2.6 
million dollars per day, making up 29.82%  of all biotechnology industry R&D. 
Considering that research from concept to m arket time frame ranges from six to 
thirteen years per product, and that the probability of successfully launching a 
m arket product hovers at five percent, Monsanto takes serious risks. This front- 
loaded risk gives Monsanto a lot more power in the patent realm, fitting neatly into 
the purpose of regulations on intellectual property. There m ust be a way to protect 
this kind of investment, or technological advancements wouldn't happen.
In reality, seed patent laws, public policy, and Monsanto practices contradict 
the core spirit of entrepreneurial patents. Intimidation tactics, a strong legal team, 
and consistent court precedent have allowed Monsanto to virtually dominate the 
market. Heavy investm ent and the heavily debated practice of patenting living 
organisms create a delicate situation, and a potential floodgate of deeper levels of 
bio-patents.
The Plant Patent Act of 1930  (PPA), the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 
(PVPA), and the Patent Act, Title 3 5 214 are the key components to biological patent 
laws. The PPA isn't useful for Monsanto, however, because it applies to asexually
214 Ma 696
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reproducing, primarily ornamental (grown for beauty as its “end use”215). It is the 
PPA and the Patent Act that are the keys. The PVPA, although covering a rather 
broad spectrum of patent rights and much easier to fall under its protection, 
includes two critical exceptions: a purchased seed that a farmer saves future 
generations of to be replanted, and for “bona fide research” purposes216. The Patent 
Act has tougher requirem ents to fit under, but only three purposefully universal 
exceptions to coverage: “abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomenon”217. 
For this reason, Monsanto, and similar corporations, lean on the Patent Act, and 
completely within their legal right to do so.
Monsanto is capable of utilizing two types of patent infringement suits: 
“purposeful infringement” and “inadvertent infringement”218. However, there is no 
documentation of inadvertent infringement cases thus-far. It is acceptable, and 
feared. The problem is nature can blow Monsanto seeds to people that haven't 
purchased them. There is not an intent requirem ent in patent law, thus a person 
could be in breach of a contract they didn't know they were a part of, and legally 
Monsanto can take action.
The maximum time for patent protection is twenty years, in any case. 
However, with seeds, it has been a constant trouble in the Federal Circuit to
216
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determine when Monsanto's “enforcement rights” are exhausted219 . Farmers have 
consistently lost on this front, tying it in with anti-trust violations that could negate 
their patent rights. The two elements that qualify for anti-trust in a contractual 
purchase of a patented product are price fixes and creating another necessary 
product that would thus monopolize the market, a tie-in220. Since Monsanto has a 
clear agreement upon purchase that prevents farmers from planting a second- 
generation seed, and recommends, not mandates Roundup be used with the 
Roundup Ready seed for optimal growing, they are not violating anti-trust or patent 
laws.
The Reality: A Dirty, Legal Game
If the agricultural industry were operating in a free-market, free-trade 
environment, all of the patent and much of the anti-trust legislation would make 
perfect sense. But the government wanting more and more planted, regardless of 
natural stipulation, has led to one type of seed virtually taking over. Genetically 
modified seeds are meant to be resistant and stronger than natural seeds, thus 
making it much easier for them to become even more dominant, without any other 
interference221. But it is im prudent to let Monsanto have a guaranteed continued 
market, especially with corn. Legislation, especially biofuels, pushes for more corn; 
Monsanto pushes more seeds.
219 Ma 705
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Monsanto has spent $5,970,000 on lobbying since 1998. Campaign 
contributions of $908,017  were provided for the 2012  election alone. The real 
power is in the placement of very im portant people; in many im portant public 
positions, who also worked for Monsanto222. Many persons in the White House, 
especially in the most critical to genetically modified products continuing in the 
market, were previous Monsanto employees who have also become the people in 
charge of approval processes. From President H.W. Bush to the current Obama 
Administration, Monsanto people have been in very crucial positions.
Although adam ant in 2007  while campaigning that agriculture wouldn't 
continue to be controlled by conglomerate interests, President Obama's choices for 
many im portant positions reflect precisely the opposite. Starting at the top, USDA 
Secretary Tom Vilsack had been a vocally pro-biotechnology governor of Iowa, pure 
corn country. The FDA Commissioner for Food? None other than former Monsanto 
Vice President. Roger Beachy, former director of a plant research center, Monsanto- 
funded of course, is currently the director of the USDA National Institute of Food 
and Agriculture223. Part of his job is determining the areas of agricultural research 
which should be federally funded. Put simply, from the bottom to the top, Monsanto 
has managed to have their product dominating the market- in a mere twenty years.
222 "QMO Food Fight: Round Two 2013.” Organic Consumers Association: Millions Against
Monsanto.
223 "GMO Food Fight: Round Two 2013.”
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Conclusions
It's easy to point to corporations using both classic and incredibly 
sophisticated techniques to get their product approved and increase shareholder 
dividends. Popular food documentaries have pointed to the corporate world as the 
primary source of food problems in both the United States and globally. The reality 
of the problem is far more complex. The interconnectedness nature of the US 
government and food costs through regulations and funding is the true root of the 
problem. With the government and the food industry so mutually dependent on one 
another, both believing they cannot survive w ithout the other, it's difficult to 
pinpoint a single critical flaw between private industry and government 
intervention.
The depth and width of corporate welfare is far beyond w hat m ost people 
would expect. Between campaigns, lobbying, judicial processes, and putting their 
people in the government, these conglomerates act more like enabled drug cartels, 
with legislators gladly dipping into the dope supply. Archer Daniels Midland and 
Monsanto Corporation invested large amounts into the 201 1-2 0 12  campaign cycles, 
and saw their return with the continuation of heavy biofuel subsidization. Monsanto 
breeds the seeds that grow the corn and ADM produces the biofuels. The result is a 
heavy loss for both consumers and taxpayers.
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On November 30th, 20 1 0 224, a group of fifteen bi-partisan Senators rose 
above party lines to support biofuel tax credits and tariff provisions. They were all 
geographically relevant to corn, and all received PAC campaign contributions. On 
the surface, this was in the interest of keeping taxpayer money from the “hands of 
unstable or unfriendly governments” as well as the reduction of foreign dependency 
on oil.
In addition, these Senators included “stability and certainty for producers 
and consumers of renewable fuels” as the basis for continued support. Biofuels are 
the easiest sell and the easiest way to ensure a lucrative relationship with the 
conglomerates. The average gift received per election was five-thousand from 
Monsanto, $4,100 from ADM, and $1,600 from the National Corn Growers 
Association, each an average gift to each of these fifteen senators in the previous six 
years. The exception was Sam Brownback who took no contributions (although was 
also retiring to become governor of Kansas)225. The result has been higher food 
prices, a step backward in renewable fuel, and continuing the incestuous 
relationship.
224 Conrad, Kent, Christopher Bond, Chuck Grassley, Tom Harkin, Amy Klobuchlar, Sam
Brownback, Tim Johnson, Mike Johanns, Debbie Stabenow, Claire McCaskill, Ben 
Nelson, John Thune, Byron Dorgan, Al Franken, and Mark Kirk. "Senate Biofuel 
Support." Letter to Majority Leader Reid and Minority Leader McConnell. 30 Nov. 2010. 
United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
225 Beckel, Michael. "Senators Supporting Ethanol Subsidies Reap Riches From Corn
Interests."OpenSecrets Blog. OpenSecrets, 3 Jan. 2011. Web.
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The problem is deep, with no simple solution. Corporations provide 
seemingly cheap food, “renewable resources”, and keep legislators happy in a 
tangled web of deceit, in which the both the consumer and the environment lose.
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VI. P r e d i c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  F u t u r e  o f  t h e  U S  F o o d
I n d u s t r y
Summary: The Broken Industry
The U.S. food industry is broken. Decades of government intervention have 
created dramatic dependencies from every angle, from production all the way to the 
supermarket. Yet ironically, American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, provides no 
relief from the status quo of elite decision makers. The depth of this mutual 
dependence can be primarily traced back to the original piece of legislation, the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which was designed to address an emergency 
situation. This experiment with Keynesian economics has continued, even as it has 
created problems, including corporate welfare, modified foods, and balanced 
budgets.
Food is, and has been, a major factor in national security. It also seems 
unclear to policy makers that it simply isn't 1933 anymore. In today's world, the 
majority of farm families don't rely on farming as their primary source of income. 
The subsidization they receive from their land, makes the average farm household 
income actually significantly higher than the average U.S. household226.
226 Edwards
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If the world was the embodiment of classical liberalism, with free trade and 
competition, the food industry wouldn't need any sort of financial support.
Shortages in some places, surpluses in others, combined with the efficiency of 
transportation in the 2 1 st century would have created a global food m arket where 
consumers had real options, reliable food sources, and efficient means of attaining 
them. But the crops that receive subsidization in the current state of affairs 
inevitably become the cheapest on the shelves, and the m ost purchased, skewing the 
advantages a free m arket could provide.
In the real world, free trade of foodstuffs is nonexistent. Many governments 
provide a financial bubble for their food producers. They are told, at least in part, 
what, where, and when to grow, provided insurance, tax breaks, and leniency, with 
regulations and interpretations of constitutional rights from food safety to free 
speech. Competition has been systematically eradicated within the US; this invites 
nations to m irror restrictiveness through tariffs and stricter requirem ents for 
m arket entry. The mercantilist tendencies of many state governments, particularly 
in the emerging economies, in the majority of their decisions and state-funded 
projects have extended a giant hand to the food industry.
While the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been very adam ant about
discussing tariff and trade issues related to agriculture. But there always seems to
be some new “m arket access” negotiation that results in countries being able to
pursue protectionist policies without international scrutiny. A nation need not
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dem onstrate a “serious injury is being caused” in order to implement said 
policies227. Agriculture free-trade policies are a hypocritical given of the nature of 
the market. Governments want to be involved, in essence violating free-market 
values. Mercantilist nations have always, and will continue to manipulate their 
currency as a part of their agricultural and broader trade policies. It's not a simple 
game of political assertion to change these dynamics, they are a reality to be dealt 
with, not debated. Playing the pseudo-free-market game creates a zero-sum game 
where the consumer, and the aggregate economy, loses.
The “good” intentions of policy makers past in the US have created the harsh 
reality of a monopolizing, vote-grabbing, lobbying, pork-barrel platter of debt and 
health issues that seems likely to remain in place. Taxpayer money is redistributed- 
not to the small farmer, or the startup business, but to the conglomerate producers. 
Between 1995-2003, the average distribution of subsidy payments was 72%  of the 
total funds available going to the top 10 recipients228. These companies are more 
than capable of insuring their own crops, buying new machinery, and determining 
growing patterns. However, the handholding between the private and public sphere 
runs so deep that there is a clear concern even from the idea of separation.
The environmental impact the food industry has had in the last hundred or 
so years has been partially unavoidable, a natural toll taken on the land to support
227 "WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION." Market Access: Special Agricultural Safeguards
(SSGs)
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the jump in global population. The mechanisms for agriculture logically needed to 
adapt, as chemicals were introduced and better, more efficient means of growing 
grew alongside. Ecologically, the earth is quite capable of maintaining and healing 
itself. However, if this pattern of continued wasteful practices continues, the earth 
won't be able to keep up, and the population will have a far more difficult time 
sustaining itself. Government has been called upon to be the solution to these future 
problems, even though many of the causes can be circled back to ineffective 
legislation.
The US federal government encouraged overproduction, overuse of land, 
im proper land use, which was followed by increased use in pesticides and fertilizers 
to make up for the dramatic decrease in viable topsoil. The monetary incentives to 
grow the top funding-receiving staple crops encourage many to particular crops are 
inefficient or simply aren't suited to grow in th at area. Political clout takes 
precedence over the natural consumer need.
State of the Global Food Industry: Outside Influences
The global nature of the current political economy is a factor that can't be
ignored in regards to evaluating the future of global food policy. Economic changes
from many places around the world clearly effect systemic forecasts and current
m arket conditions, including commodity prices, like food. Few are willing to blindly
accept US proclamations of “free trade” food, especially seeing historically how it
actually plays out given that the US m arket is incredibly manipulated. Emerging
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BRIC nations are willing to participate, but by their own rules of mercantilist, 
protectionist policies.
2012  was the perfect maelstrom of events to create a precarious situation for 
the global food market. One part was the dramatic drought and high tem peratures 
that wrecked North America in the summer. Corn truly is king in the US system, and 
relying heavily on one crop did cause some shock through the system. Speculation 
ran rampant, with corn futures still looking bullish in early 2013. The combination 
of increased global demand for ethanol production (specifically corn-based in the 
United States), high summer oil prices, and the speculation means that many more 
will w ant to plant corn. Such potential m arket flooding will push out even more of 
the few small producers left, and propel upward the cost of production. With the 
increase in land used for corn production, there will inevitably also be shortages in 
other staple crop areas, especially wheat, and food prices in the aggregate will be 
driven up as well.
The pressures that environment, government, and the global food industry
will face in food price increases and shortages will not help the economic situation
in the Global North. It will be more dramatic for the developing world, where so
much more of their income is devoted to buying food. Any increase can cause
dramatic changes in lifestyle for many families. This is compounded with the
growing tensions in some of the poorest parts of the world, and could escalate into
increased tensions and conflict. Non-diversified domestic markets, falling into the
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bullish times of certain crop production, will be hit a second time when the m arket
begins to wane and production is cost-prohibitive. The constant up and down puts
the world food m arket in even more uncertainty. Such conditions make it more
likely that authoritarian ideas and leaders will make and emotional and appealing
case to the people impacted.
Food Demand, Limited Supplies
The unprecedented and intense world population growth has already
increased the problem of feeding the world population. With the technology and
environmental manipulation available, the possibilities seemed endless in the early
1990s. Not anticipated were the inefficiencies in the government-mandated food
market. Growing where plants aren't supposed to, pesticides running into
freshwater sources, and the hefty am ount of petro-chemicals and oil needed to get
products to the shelves have ensured the global food supply is as precarious as it
previously was, just with a lot of additives and compounded problems.
The technology for desalinization plants to make salt w ater drinkable has
always been seen as a future resource. However, at the moment freshwater is a
commodity. It's a commodity that isn't being used efficiently, and will quickly start
to cost dramatically more. On the other side of the equation, oil is expensive, and
probably won't be significantly cheaper in the future.
Heavy oil-exporting countries will pull back the supply once the Keystone
Pipeline and more deep-water drilling come to fruition. There will still be the
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appearance of scarcity, and there will still be a significant cost factor. Allowing more 
of the m arket to be involved in food production, essentially allowing competition to 
have a chance is a necessary step in efficiency so desperately needed in the food 
industry. Oil is a tough, also subsidy ridden, key to the global economy, of course 
greatly effecting agricultural production. Although the problem of oil may not be 
solved for a long time, allowing true competition to allocate resources will 
inherently be more efficient than government intervention.
Current Policies and the Future
Based on 2012  national election results, it's clear that deficit spending isn't 
going away. The precarious situation of the early 2013  Fiscal Cliff and inability of 
representatives to make anything but last minute robberies of the American 
people's futures makes it's clear the food industry will remain one of conglomerates. 
The inability of the right to effectively evaluate military spending and the blatant 
disregard for reality pretending to do business in monopoly money shows that there 
will have to be a rock bottom before any real change will be seen. The bottom will 
consist of a Europe broken and financially crumbled, deadweight pension deficits in 
the US, and a thriving combination of export and internal consuming BRIC nations 
rising. At the current rate of threats from North Korea, the potential for a second 
Cold War looms heavy in future predictions of the global balance of power.
Since the staple crops have evolved into highly traded futures' commodities,
speculation on food prices will grow. The clear need for more and more food will
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make it a hot product in the global financial markets, kept stable only by constant 
intervention by governments. At the current rate of investm ent and pressure for 
more, I predict a food-futures bubble much like the 2 0 0 8  global financial meltdown.
The scale of this potential crisis would be impacted by droughts, oil prices, 
availability of water, global tensions and control by conglomerates. The more these 
futures are seen as reliable and lucrative, the more they have the potential to be 
heavily bundled, as were mortgages, also federally backed, “safe” investments. The 
volume of food produced both in the US and globally, is another reason food 
commodities are deemed safe. With the increase in demand for corn ethanol in the 
US, it seems the bullish times will continue. However, the more futures markets are 
depended on, the tougher the fall can be.
Assuming current Frank-Dodd legislation holds up, there will be much less 
available capital in the market since banks must hold on to much more liquid 
capital, protectionist policies and bailouts would provide another crushing blow to 
the potential the free m arket could bring. The safety net of government intervention 
means another round of highly produced commodity crops, and more power to the 
state-backed conglomerates to ensure food supply never runs out. If there are any 
small producers left, they would easily be bought out during a finnancial food crisis 
with limited capital availability for loans, the necessary capital to keep day-to-day, 
or seasons of growing, viable.
Conclusion
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Oil price increases, w ater becoming more expensive, inflation, and the 
creation of virtual cartels of food will ensure prices keep going up in the 
supermarket. The crux of the problem comes down to the intervention of 
government in such an enormous entity of the US economy. The massive am ount of 
federal and state money available to the food industry, paired with the desire for a 
conglomerate-style food industry in the 1970s perpetuated and deepened the core 
problems with the food industry. The cornerstone of American food production isn't 
competition, or m arket demand; it has instead become corporations and politicians 
toeing the line of self-interested law.
Nutrition, our most basic need for subsistence, has been turned into a 
bidding war between big companies, big commodities, and powerful legislators for 
who gets to attain a larger share of the chemically-dependent public. The real 
problem is not the simple “greed” of business or the lack of understanding of the 
public; it's the unwise policies of the desperate, bid-seeking, elected representatives 
and appointed officials. Food policy is broken. The government not only perpetuates 
it, clearly less concerned with the future than with instant gratification. This will not 
be sustainable in the long run, and it certainly isn't w hat people would ultimately 
choose for themselves, and their families, if individual rights were upheld.
The United States is known for its wonderful ability to appreciate and accept
new technology and the promises it can bring. While this still holds true,
government invention in technology alongside botched Keynesian economic policy
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fundamentally altered w hat the food industry could have been. W ithout significant, 
meaningful action to reduce government's role in agriculture in the next few 
decades, the American people, and the global population will face great challenges in 
our most basic need: for the agriculture to be reliable producers of sustenance.
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